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Creating a system that is always protected and secure
in all situations against all attackers is a far-reaching
and likely impossible goal. It is important for
researchers to continue to move systems closer towards
absolute security, but it is also essential to create
techniques so a system can adaptively defend against
an attacker who circumvents the current security.
Deception for cyber defense approaches this goal—to
rebalance the asymmetric nature of computer defense
by increasing attacker workload while decreasing that
of the defender.
Cyber deception is a collection of defensive techniques
that considers the human component of cyber attacks.
Deception holds promise as a successful tactic for
making an attacker’s job harder because it does more
than just block access: it can also cause the attacker to
waste both time and effort. Moreover, deception can be
used by a defender to impart an incorrect belief in the
attacker, the effects of which can go beyond any static
defense. Understanding the cognition and behavior of
both the cyber defender and cyber attacker is a critical
component of cybersecurity.
In the cyber world, an attacker often only knows what
is perceived through observation of the target network.
The intruder may be thousands of miles away from the
network to which he or she is attempting to gain entry.
Networks often unintentionally provide more
information to an attacker than defenders would like.
However, the network owner also has the opportunity
to reveal information he or she desires the attacker to
know—including deceptive information. Because
network information is often complex and incomplete,
it provides a natural environment in which to imbed
deception since, in chaos, there is opportunity.
Deception can alter the mindset, confidence, and
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decision-making process of an attacker, which can be
more effective than traditional defenses. Furthermore,
using deception for defensive purposes gives the
defender at least partial control of what an attacker will
know, and provides opportunities for strategic
interaction with an attacker.
These research efforts require an interdisciplinary
approach which is exemplified in the accepted papers
which cross multiple disciplines. It is essential to
understand attacker and defender cognition and
behavior to effectively and strategically use cyber
deception to induce cognitive biases and increase
cognitive load, making our systems difficult to attack.
This minitrack provides a venue for innovative
research that rigorously examines advancements in
cyber deception technologies, evaluations, case studies
and models of cyber deception effects, as well as
improved understanding of the cognition and behaviors
of cyber operators. This year the minitrack features the
following eleven papers and is closely linked to the
HICSS-53 symposium entitled “Cyber Psychology
Aids National Security”:

•

•
•

•

“Design of Dynamic and Personalized Deception:
A Research Framework and New Insights” (by
Cleotilde Gonzalez, Palvi Aggarwal, Christian
Lebiere, Edward Cranford)
“Delivering Honeypots as a Service” (by Jafar
Haadi Jafarian, Amirreza Niakanlahiji)
“Creating Convincing Industrial-Control-System
Honeypots” (by Neil Rowe, Thuy Nguyen, Marian
Kendrick, Zaky Rucker, Dahae Hyun, Justin
Brown)
“Invasion of the Botnet Snatchers: A Case Study
in Applied Malware Cyberdeception” (by Jared
Chandler, Kathleen Fisher, Erin Chapman, Eric
Davis, Adam Wick)
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•
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“Towards a Holistic Model of Deception: Subject
Matter Expert Validation” (by Iaian Reid, Rob
Black)
“The Moonraker Study: An Experimental
Evaluation of Host-Based Deception” (by Temmie
Shade, Andrew Rogers, Kimberly FergusonWalter, Sara Beth Elsen, Daniel Fayette, Kristin
Heckman)
“Adaptive Cyber Deception: Cognitively Informed
Signaling for Cyber Defense” (by Edward
Cranford, Cleotilde Gonzalez, Palvi Aggarwal,
Sarah Cooney, Milind Tambe, Christian Lebiere)
“HoneyBug: Personalized Cyber Deception for
Web Applications” (by Amirreza Niakanlahiji,
Jafar Haadi Jafarian, Bei-Tseng Chu, Ehab AlShaer)
“A Deception Planning Framework for Cyber
Defense” (by Jafar Haadi Jafarian, Amirreza
Niakanlahiji)
“Concealing Cyber-Decoys using Two-Sided
Feature Deception Games” (by Mohammad Sujan
Miah, Marcus Gutierrez, Oscar Veliz, Omkar
Thakoor, Christopher Kiekintveld)
“Automating Cyberdeception Evaluation with
Deep Learning” (by Gbadebo Ayoade, Frederico
Araujo, Khaled Al-naami, Ahmad Mustafa, Yang
Gao, Kevin Hamlen, Latifur Khan)
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